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RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0405
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0353
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SUBJECT: VISITING IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S MESSAGE FOR THE U.S.

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman, for reasons 1.4 (B) (D) (E)

11. (S) FM Kubis asked AMB to meet early morning March 14 to pass along the results of his discussions with visiting Iranian FM Mottaki March 13, including a message that he said Mottaki had conveyed for the U.S. (see para 3). Kubis made clear throughout our conversation that he did not think FM Mottaki's position on the nuclear issue or his message to us contained anything really new. Kubis stressed he was just passing the message, not making any case and not pursuing the matter further. Kubis specifically informed Slovak PermRep to the UN Burian that there was nothing fundamentally new in Mottaki's ideas, and instructed him to continue his efforts in the UNSC as Slovakia had planned, i.e., supporting further Chapter VII sanctions. We would guess Mottaki will be conveying the same message at his other stops on this trip, including Italy, Slovenia, Belgium and Switzerland.

12. (S) On the nuclear issue, Mottaki's bottom line message was a plea for Slovak support in getting the UNSC to issue a statement (Presidential or press) rather than passing a second resolution. Protesting unconvincingly to Kubis that, of course, Iran was not afraid of a resolution, Mottaki said the GOI understood that the UNSC had to take some action. But that if the UNSC would forego a resolution for awhile, the GOI would "agree to the additional IAEA protocol" on further controls and verification. The GOI would then be ready to engage in 4-6 weeks of discussion on the larger issues. "What is the rush?", Mottaki asked. Kubis said he told Mottaki that the international community's "rush" was prompted by the Iranians, rush to enrich uranium. Mottaki claimed Iran was ready "to do many things," including looking into the idea of a mutual suspension of enrichment and sanctions. But the proper environment had to be created to do so, and that meant no resolution now. Kubis told the Ambassador, however, that he did not get the sense Iran was really willing to suspend enrichment. He noted, for example, that Mottaki had said Iran would be willing to consider al-Baradei's time out proposal, but only after the environment had been prepared by the adoption of a statement vice resolution. Kubis said that the only thing he heard from Mottaki that he had not heard previously was Mottaki's reference to the recent developments with North Korea and the possibility of looking at that as a model. Kubis said privately and publicly that the GOS would continue to back further sanctions. Mottaki commented that sanctions did not work, and that the U.S. would not be able to sow dissension within Iran with such measures.

13. (S) At the end of the dinner, Mottaki asked to speak to

Kubis privately, then said he had a message for the USG. Iran understands the importance of the situation in Iraq. Given that it is a top USG priority, Iran was ready to discuss this and non-Iraq issues with the US, if the environment were "ripe" (i.e., no UNSC resolution). Mottaki claimed the Iraqi government would have Tehran's cooperation regardless of what happened with a resolution, but without a quid pro quo, the GOI would do nothing to help the US Administration in Iraq. Mottaki claimed to Kubis that Amb. Khalilzad had approached the Iranian representative twice during the Baghdad Neighbors' conference on March 10 to discuss a bilateral meeting/channel for communication, but that Mottaki responded that a channel already existed, and that Iran would not participate in a different one.

14. (S) FM Kubis also emphasized that the GOS had refused Mottaki's request to see PM Fico. The Iranians told the Slovaks in the run-up to the visit that Mottaki would be seeing the heads of government in Italy, Belgium and Slovenia. When The Slovaks told Mottaki he would not be seeing Fico (Kubis strongly recommended to the PM that he decline, and Fico did), Mottaki said he would reconsider whether he should come at all. The GOS told the GOI that decision was up to Mottaki, but Kubis would be the highest level available. Obviously, Mottaki came. Mottaki also asked Kubis to visit Tehran. Kubis said the circumstances were not appropriate for a visit now.

VALLEE